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Although the objectives of the Energiewende (energy transition) are broadly accepted in Germany, the practical ways of
achieving them remain highly contentious. In particular, the question of whether and how security of supply can
be guaranteed over the course of this profound transformation of the energy system is currently the subject of
controversy in the scientific and public debate. Recently, calls for additional payments to power plant operators
for providing generation capacity have grown increasingly loud. But the introduction of capacity payments of this sort
could have far-reaching consequences for the future organisation of Germany’s electricity supply. Therefore, the political
decision on this issue - which is scheduled for this year - should not be made without a sound scientific analysis.
Basically, measures aimed at guaranteeing security of supply must address the possible causes of capacity shortages as
broadly as possible. When designing such measures, besides security of supply, additional objectives such as
cost-effectiveness and the environmental and social acceptability of electricity supply should also be taken into
account. Capacity payments only partially meet these requirements. Moreover, once introduced, they are difficult to adapt,
or revise even, to suit changing framework conditions. This is particularly problematic in view of the current lack of clear
evidence for future security of supply problems. Therefore, introducing capacity payments at this point in time would not
appear to be constructive. It would make more sense to introduce instead a mix of measures which would strengthen
the electricity market, create conditions for feeding in electricity from renewable energy sources as and when required,
and set incentives for the expansion of grid capacity, storage systems and demand side management. Should security of
supply still appear uncertain under these changed framework conditions, the introduction of a strategic reserve, which
would be held by the regulatory authority or the transmission system operator, is recommended - not, however,
the creation of an entirely new, additional market segment in the form of a capacity market.
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Recently, fears that a secure supply of electricity might be
jeopardised in the course of the German Energiewende have
increasingly been expressed [1-3]. The reasons for these
concerns are varied. On the one hand, the share of inter-
mittent renewable energy sources (wind and solar) has been
increasing steadily [4]. As a consequence, the challenge of
balancing not only fluctuating demand but also a partly
volatile energy supply with flexible generation capacities
has been moving increasingly centre stage. On the other* Correspondence: paul.lehmann@ufz.de
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in any medium, provided the original work is phand, wholesale prices on the electricity exchanges have
fallen in the past few years for a variety of reasons [5].
As a result, operators of fossil-fired power plants find
themselves facing problems of profitability. Announce-
ments by power plant operators proclaiming that con-
ventional power plants are to be decommissioned or
not built at all in the short-to-medium term bear testimony
to this development [3,6]. Insufficient investment in con-
ventional reserve power plants could - some fear - lead to
growing supply bottlenecks in Germany, at the latest with
the final shutdown of the last nuclear power plants in 2022.is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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The introduction of capacity payments for operators of
conventional power plants as a way of ensuring the future
supply of electricity is currently being debated intensely
and controversially.b Under such a scheme, power plant
operators would not only be remunerated for the electri-
city they produce (in kilowatt hours) - as is the case at the
moment - but would also receive an additional payment
for the guaranteed capacity they provide (in watts) [7].
The goal of these payments would be to attain a certain
level of guaranteed generation capacity. They could also
contribute to preventing decommissioning of existing con-
ventional power plants and provide incentives for building
new power plants. In principle, storage system operators
and electricity consumers who are willing to temporarily
cut back on their consumption could conceivably also
profit from such payments. In the last two years, various
proposals have been drawn up on precisely how the design
of such a capacity mechanism for Germany should look
[8-12]. The spectrum ranges from the provision of suffi-
cient reserve capacities via the regulatory authority or
transmission system operator (strategic reserve) through
to more competitively organised mechanisms such as a
capacity market. For the purpose of the discussion, it is
therefore important to distinguish whether the introduc-
tion of a capacity mechanism in general (of whatever
design) or a specific capacity market is under consider-
ation. What can be said is that, ultimately, all of the
proposed options for a state-initiated capacity mechanism
envisage additional payments to power plant operators.
In the process, the debate about capacity payments was
strongly pushed forward by commissioned reports. At the
same time, the topic was placed on the political agenda. For
instance, in the coalition agreement, Germany’s governing
parties declared their intention to ‘develop a capacity mech-
anism in the medium term’ ([13], p. 41). The so-called
Green Paper entitled ‘An Electricity Market for Germany’s
Energy Transition’ published by the German Federal
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in October
2014 was aimed at launching a new consultation process in
the run-up to the final decision, which is due in the course
of this year [14]. Yet, even in the Green Paper, the introduc-
tion of a capacity mechanism in the form of a capacity re-
serve is deemed necessary, at least for a transition period.
However, this prior assumption has attracted criticism from
scientists and expertsc.
Current calls for capacity payments are premature
Basically, the introduction of capacity payments would
have far-reaching implications for the future organisation
of Germany’s energy supply. Decisions to invest in or re-
tire power plants would no longer be (alone) steered by
prices on the electricity exchange, which signal scarcitiesand surpluses in the market. Instead, decisions would be
influenced significantly by additional, state-administered
capacity payments. The amount of these payments would
depend more or less directly on the politically set
framework, such as the specified total capacity required.
Thus, capacity payments create a new area for government
intervention - and possibly also for disincentives set by the
state. Furthermore, capacity mechanisms also give rise to
fundamental concerns about regulatory policy: For instance,
they open up additional possibilities for the state to
intervene in the spatial distribution and composition of
Germany’s power plant fleet. In addition, experience shows
that payment flows once created by capacity mechanisms -
which ultimately can be understood as subsidiesd - can only
be taken back with difficulty, even if they lose their poten-
tial legitimacy for the energy sector in the future. Hence,
the introduction of capacity payments should be carefully
considered.
Lack of evidence pointing to a need for capacity
payments
In the context of the discussion on capacity mechanisms,
many questions that are crucial to the evaluation of pro-
posals for further developing the current design of the elec-
tricity market in a meaningful way have so far remained
unanswered. These questions relate not only to the exist-
ence of security of supply problems and their underlying
causes but also to alternative solution concepts and their
respective suitability:
– Will security of supply really be jeopardised in the
future if the current regulatory conditions remain in
place - or are the current (threatened) retirements
of power plants merely the right economic response
to existing excess capacity?
– To which market and regulatory failures can
potential capacity constraints be attributed? Is
security of supply really threatened primarily by the
transformation in the energy sector?
– To what extent can capacity mechanisms adequately
address the various conceivable causes of possible
capacity constraints? And are they suitable to
stimulate the required flexible capacities in a
targeted manner?
– What negative side effects can capacity payments
have? How do they fit at all into an electricity
market that is currently taking leave of purely
state-administered payments for renewable energy
sources?
Then there is also the question as to the potential al-
ternative options to capacity payments. It becomes clear
that so far there has been no satisfactory problem diag-
nosis, nor has the suitability of the presented proposals
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these circumstances, the introduction of capacity pay-
ments at the present time appears over-hasty and ill-
considered. Further scientific analyses of the need for
capacity payments, particularly also in the German con-
text - as recently set in motion by the Federal Economics
Ministry’s Green Paper - are crucial in order to arrive at
policy recommendations that will be sustainable in the
long term.
Security of supply will not be accomplished alone
by building power plants
The essential starting point for any analysis of capacity pay-
ments is a comprehensive, systematic understanding of
security of supply. In this light, security of supply should be
understood as the permanent balancing of electricity supply
and demand, taking into account all possible options for
action of market actors. Security of supply cannot be en-
sured through the construction or continued operation of
fossil-fired power plants alone. In fact, in principle, all other
actors in the electricity supply system - operators of renew-
able energy installations, grids and storage systems as well
as energy consumers - can contribute to security of supply
as well [15,16]. In this context, security of supply does not
merely mean that the maximum expected energy con-
sumption (taking the possible reduction and flexibilisation
potential of demand into account) must be covered by
guaranteed generation. Additionally, sufficient flexible cap-
acities must be available in order to be able to respond to
short-term, unexpected disruptions in the system so that
grid stability can be guaranteed, ideally at all times [15,17].
Security of supply risks should not be minimised
at all costs
A reasonable discussion of measures aimed at ensuring se-
curity of supply must consider all societally relevant criteria
and objectives. Unquestionably, a certain level of security of
supply should be guaranteed at the lowest possible cost.
Bearing that in mind, the regulatory framework must be
chosen in such a way that, from an economic perspective,
the most efficient investments are made - regardless of
whether they relate to the construction of new power
plants, the expansion of storage systems and grids, demand
side management, or a mixture of those options. Further-
more, the question of who would have to shoulder the
potential additional costs of greater security of supply has
to be examined. What additional burdens would be placed
on private households? Would the social debate on energy
prices be further intensified? To what extent would the
competitiveness of companies be damaged by additional
energy costs? And, last but not least, measures aimed
at ensuring security of supply must be compatible with
the goals of climate protection, the expansion of renewable
energy sources and energy efficiency. Possible synergies andconflicts between these various goals must therefore be suf-
ficiently understood and taken into consideration.
No evidence so far for short- or medium-term
capacity shortages
In principle, the electricity market in its current form
rewards investments in new power plants and storage sys-
tems as well as electricity demand adjustments. The market
for balancing energy which ensures short-term stability of
the system also rewards particularly flexible options for bal-
ancing supply and demand. Theoretically, long-term signals
for the construction of power plants or storage systems are
sent by the forward markets [14,18]. Only the network
infrastructure, which by its economic nature represents a
natural monopoly, cannot be managed efficiently via the
electricity market. The functionality of the electricity mar-
ket can, however, be additionally impaired for various rea-
sons. Market power, the short-term pursuit of returns on
investments or imperfect handling of market uncertainties
can affect the efficiency of market actors’ decisions. Also,
under the current framework conditions, electricity con-
sumers only respond to short-term changes in price signals
of electricity scarcity to a limited degree, especially since
such changes are frequently not even passed on to the
end-user. In addition, the regulatory conditions - such as
politically determined price ceilings or lengthy authorisa-
tion procedures - can put a brake on investments.e State
support for renewable energy sources can exacerbate some
of these problems (see the section ‘The Energiewende
should not be scapegoated for potential supply constraints’
below): Support for renewables contributes to decreasing
electricity exchange prices and revenues for the opera-
tors of conventional power plants [19]. At the same
time, support primarily aimed at bringing intermittent
energy sources (wind, solar) to the market increases the
volatility of energy prices and so contributes to invest-
ment uncertainty [20]. Nevertheless, due to the lack of
unambiguous empirical evidence, it remains unclear
whether and to what extent security of supply might be
compromised in the future. Typical indicators suggest
that, in principle, there is enough capacity available to
cover the maximum expected demand for electricity.
Thus, the power account balance, i.e. the balance between
(guaranteed) power plant capacity and the maximum de-
mand for electricity, is positive at the moment and probably
will be for the coming years ([21,22], p. 32 f.).f What is
more, other European countries have overcapacities and
Germany could import more electricity from them. How-
ever, some constraints may exist in the short-term balan-
cing of electricity supply and demand, that is, in the
flexibility of the electricity supply system. This is perhaps
indicated by the Federal Network Agency’s prohibition on
power plant shutdowns and the call-up of the grid reserve
for redispatch purposes ([22], p. 41 f.; [23]). Nevertheless,
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straints than of insufficient generation capacity [24].It is doubtful that capacity payments can help to
solve the problem
Capacity payments, when adequately designed, can with-
out doubt serve as an effective means of achieving a
certain level of guaranteed capacity. Other countries’ ex-
periences with capacity mechanisms are nonetheless
quite conflicting [25,26]. Yet it is less clear whether cap-
acity payments can activate precisely those options that
are flexible enough to balance supply and demand - such
as flexible fossil-fired power plants, storage systems or
demand side management. Additional pre-qualification
requirements for the granting of capacity payments - as
envisaged by some but by no means all of the proposed
models - must be established to ensure this.
Capacity mechanisms, as simple, state-administered pay-
ments without a time limit, also give rise to regulatory pol-
icy issues. For instance, it remains to be clarified how
capacity payments should be evaluated in respect of the
equally relevant energy policy objectives of economic effi-
ciency and environmental and social acceptability. Essen-
tially, capacity payments only address the actual causes of
possible security of supply problems to a limited extent -
that is, the various existing market and regulatory deficits
(see the section ‘No evidence so far for short- or medium-
term capacity shortages’ above). Moreover, in the future,
capacity payments - particularly when institutionalised
through an entirely new ‘capacity market’ - can only be ad-
justed to changing circumstances, or even fundamentally
revised, with difficulty. After all, it is to be expected that the
future recipients of payments would have a vested interest
in maintaining the payments and that they would assert
their interest politically. The distributional implications of
capacity payments also remain unclear: if they result in ris-
ing energy prices, capacity payments will give rise to a sub-
stantial redistribution of income from the electricity
consumers to the electricity suppliers operating the power
plants [27]. Social and industrial policy concerns have fre-
quently been expressed in connection with the expected
price effects caused by the promotion of renewable energy
sources. Such concerns must therefore also be taken into
consideration in the case of novel and tendentially unlim-
ited payments for conventional power plant capacities.
Ultimately, we also have to ask whether new payments
for existing fossil-fired installations would not essen-
tially complicate the transition to a more sustainable
electricity supply, which in the year 2050 is supposed to
be based predominantly on renewable energy sources. After
all, capacity payments would possibly incentivise the con-
struction of new fossil-fired power plants which would be
in existence over several decades to come. This applies inparticular if the EU emissions trading scheme is not suffi-
ciently strengthened.
Strengthening of existing structures should have
priority
At the same time, there are alternatives to capacity pay-
ments. Security of supply can also be guaranteed through
a mix of instruments. For example, measures aimed at
strengthening the existing electricity market could make a
contribution. Possible options range from the completion
of deregulation of the electricity market (in order to contain
market power and make price ceilings redundant) to re-
gionally differentiated wholesale prices (for better signalling
of regional capacity constraints) right through to acceler-
ated authorisation procedures for building new infrastruc-
ture [14,18,28]. In the area of energy transformation policy,
incentives for a more demand-based feed-in of electricity
from renewable energy sources could be set [29-32]. A fun-
damental strengthening of the emissions trading scheme
would also shift investment decisions in the power plant
sector towards gas power plants with lower emission and
greater flexibility. In addition, targeted measures could set
incentives for the construction and operation of grids, stor-
age systems and demand side management. In this case,
too, the imaginable portfolio is broad, ranging from adjust-
ments to incentive regulation for networks through to sup-
port for technology and research relating to battery storage
and smart grids [33-35].
From an economic perspective, a mix of instruments
aimed at addressing the various causes of insufficient secur-
ity of supply can lead to lower macroeconomic costs than
fixed capacity payments. Furthermore, some of the instru-
ments would also confer other advantages in addition
to security of supply. For example, a tightening of the
emissions trading scheme would also enhance the ef-
fectiveness of climate protection policy. The additional
administrative burden of such a mix of instruments is
likely to be limited: Many of the possible alternatives
for ensuring security of supply have already been im-
plemented and require strengthening and realignment
more than anything else. But by nature such a mix of
instruments is not without its problems. Given the high
regulatory complexity involved, the combined measures
must be carefully coordinated to complement each other.
Moreover, the ultimate distribution effects in the mix of
policy instruments are difficult to predict. And whether a
combination of measures can actually be more flexibly
adapted to changing framework conditions than centrally
administered capacity payments is also questionable.
The Energiewende should not be scapegoated for
potential supply constraints
The impression often arising from the current debate on
security of supply is that potential problems can be attributed
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of renewable energy sources and the phase-out of nu-
clear power. Without a doubt, the increasing share of
(intermittent) renewable energy sources, especially
wind and solar energy, in electricity generation as a
whole creates additional challenges for ensuring secur-
ity of supply [20,15,17,19]. Nevertheless, a differenti-
ated look at the framework conditions under which the
electricity market operates today (see the section ‘No
evidence so far for short- or medium-term capacity
shortages’ above) also shows that the Energiewende is
just one of numerous causes of possible supply constraints.
Many of the challenges mentioned (e.g. short-term profit
maximisation under uncertainty or low demand response)
would also arise without the energy transition. Further-
more, in the medium-term market, actors will respond to
the energy transition, even without state intervention, and
will take measures conducive to ensuring security of supply.
So, the support of renewable energy sources increases
end consumer prices and therewith sets additional in-
centives for reducing electricity demand. When nuclear
power plants are shut down, operating times and reve-
nues for fossil-fired power plants go up in the medium
term [36]. Therefore, it is clear that adjustments, particu-
larly to support schemes for renewable energy sources, have
to be taken into consideration as a way of helping to secure
supply in the long term. The Energiewende is not, however,
the sole ‘scapegoat’ for possible future supply constraints.
And it would certainly not be prudent to put the Energie-
wende on the back burner in the interest of security of
supply.An intelligent portfolio of measures instead of
capacity payments for fossil-fired power plants
The debate on security of supply symbolises the complexity
and manifold uncertainties associated with Germany’s Ener-
giewende. Particularly under these circumstances, from a
scientific perspective, it is important at this point not to
make far-reaching and profound decisions such as introdu-
cing novel, permanent regulatory instruments in the ab-
sence of clear evidence. It would appear to make more
sense to have a security of supply policy that stands on
many legs. A portfolio of measures can help to tackle the
diverse causes of possible capacity constraints in a more
targeted and cost-effective manner. In doing so, given the
complexity and uncertainty involved, it is important that
the political process is designed to be as transparent and
participatory as possible so that the perspectives of all the
relevant actors - including those of electricity suppliers, grid
and storage system operators and, not least, energy con-
sumers - can be given due consideration [37]. In addition,
the political instruments must be chosen such that they can
be adapted to future changing framework conditions. Forpolitical reasons, this seems rather unlikely once capacity
payments have been granted.
Credible political commitment needed
Admittedly, a political strategy aimed at ensuring security
of supply without capacity payments can only work if policy
makers can give credible assurances that a capacity mech-
anism will not be introduced in the foreseeable future.
Otherwise a self-fulfilling prophecy threatens: in expect-
ation of possible future capacity payments, companies
might see themselves incentivised to strategically hold off
on investments and, with the announcement of power plant
shutdowns, create a political threat. Ultimately, even just
the political prospect of a future possibility of a capacity
mechanism would in the end make it politically inevitable
due to this strategic withholding of investment [38].
A strategic reserve as a risk buffer?
It is the task of policy makers to evaluate the established
uncertainties with regard to ensuring the supply of elec-
tricity and to make decisions on this basis. Therefore, it
would be politically legitimate if, following careful and
transparent consideration, political decision makers were
to conclude that additional capacity-building measures
are essential to safeguard against possible supply con-
straints. But in this case, given the current knowledge
gaps, it would be crucial that the mechanism be selected
in such a way that less rigid structures emerge in the fu-
ture which - with better evidence of the performance
capacity of conventional electricity markets and a clear
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of
various measures - would be difficult to adjust. There-
fore, if a decision in favour of capacity payments is made
at political level, then efforts should be made to ensure a
strategic, centrally administered capacity reserve (stra-
tegic reserve) as a short- and medium-term risk buffer.
This approach could provide the required flexible cap-
acities in a targeted manner. What is more, it could be
reversed at any time.
The Green Paper on the electricity market calls for a fun-
damental policy decision between an optimised ‘electricity
market 2.0’ embedded in a package of measures aimed at
strengthening flexibility and securing supply on the one
hand, and extra payments for conventional power plants in
the sense of a capacity market on the other ([14], p. 40).
Considering the various uncertainties, there is apparently
more to be said for the first option at present. A package of
measures could address the diverse causes of possible sup-
ply bottlenecks in a more targeted manner and at the same
time take better account of the requirements of economic
efficiency and environmental and social acceptability. The
introduction of a strategic reserve can - depending on the
political assessment of the threat to security of supply - be
among the flanking measures accompanying the ‘electricity
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acity markets for conventional power plants, on the other
hand, would fail to address the root causes of supply bottle-
necks, neglect important objectives of sustainable energy
policy and, in addition, lead to a specific predetermined so-
lution that would be difficult, if not impossible, to revise in
a regulatory environment that is on the whole uncertain.
Therefore, based on our current knowledge, capacity mar-
kets of this kind are not recommended.
Endnotes
aThis article is based on a detailed discussion paper,
see [39].
bSee numerous studies which either propose capacity
mechanisms [8-12] or question the need for them
[18,20,27,38,40-43].
cSee, e. g. [18,20,27,38,40-43].
dFrom an economic perspective, it is important to deter-
mine whether capacity payments lead to welfare gains and
to what extent redistribution takes place. In addition,
whether capacity payments constitute state aid has to be le-
gally clarified; see for instance [14].
eFor an overview of possible causes, see [7,18].
fOn the expected future development, see also [44].
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